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P.: Evidence--Prohibition of Spousal Testimony in Criminal Trials--Co
CASE COMMENTS

found the statement to be admissible. In determining whether the
accused heard and understood the incriminatory statement, the surrounding circumstances and the ability of the accused to hear the
statement are proper matters for the court to consider. Furthermore,
every effort should be made to show how near the defendant was to
the accuser so that it will clearly appear whether the statement was
heard by the defendant. Leaving the question for a jury to decide
would be to permit the jury to hear statements which may be highly
prejudicial to the accused. Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1266, 1279
(1954). It is submitted that there should be a more responsible assumption by the trial judge of the duty to decide preliminary questions of fact, as in the principal case, to determine whether the statement and the accused's conduct in response thereto are admissible in
evidence, in order to better protect the accused against a misinterpretation of his silence.
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Mann Act for transportating a girl from Arkansas to Oklahoma for
immoral purposes. D contended that he took the girl on the trip as
an accommodation to her, and not to facilitate her practice of prostitution in Oklahoma. The Mann Act requires immoral purpose as
a dominant motive for conviction, so that this defense, if accepted by
the jury, would have prevented D's conviction. After D's conviction in the state court, he appealed and assigned as grounds that he
was prejudicially affected by the state court allowing his wife to
testify as to her prostitution before and after marriage, and as to her
prostitution in Oklahoma at the time of the alleged act D's conviction was upheld by the United States district court and by the court
of appeals. On certiorari, United States Supreme Court reversed,
refusing to modify the common law rule which forbids one spouse
from testifying for or against the other. The court said that, since
the factual issue of the case depended upon the purpose of the trip,
the testimony of D's wife was prejudicial to him. Hawkins v. United
States, 79 Sup. Ct. 136 (1958).
The principal case represents the latest attempt to modify one
of the most cherished rules of common law, the rule forbidding a
wife to testify against her husband in a criminal trial. 8 WGMOBE,
EvmEc § 2227 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore and most
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statutes codifying the common law indicate that one major qualification of the rule is recognized in cases of "crimes against the other",
meaning of course, the other spouse. Such crimes generally contemplate physical acts such as battery, abduction or other physical injuries to the offended spouse but may include testimony as to fraud,
adultery or desertion. This qualification does not extend to crimes
against the other spouse's property or to crimes against a stranger.
8 WiGmoRE,

EVIDENCE

§ 2289.

West Virginia has codified the common rule and forbids one
spouse from testifying against the other in a criminal case without
the defendant's consent. West Virginia also has the general "crimes
against the other" provision qualifying the common law rule. W.
VA. CoDEy ch. 57, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1955). In view of the West
Virginia statute, a case similar to the principal case would probably
result in the same decision in West Virginia.
The basic problem in this area is not that of determining what
the court will do in cases similar to the principal case. Due to the
long standing of the common law rule this inquiry is readily answered. Rather, the problem is that of determining whether the application given the rule by the courts is the proper one. Obviously,
this intricate socio-legal question has no perfect answer.
The original reason for the rule was to protect marital harmony
by preventing ill feelings which might result from one spouse testifying against the other. In view of the increase in the divorce rate,
any rule tending to perpetuate a marriage seems desirable. Some
legal scholars contend the rule hampers administration of justice
and tends to exclude much evidence from criminal trials. Of course,
admission of any evidence leading to an effective administration of
justice seems desirable. Choosing between these two arguments
would seem to involve a value judgment more dependent on one's
personal philosophy than on legal principles. An examination of the
latest developments in this area as spelled out by the courts gives a
somewhat more satisfactory answer from the legal, if not the philosophical, standpoint.
The Hawkins case reaffirmed the common law rule and reversed
the defendant's conviction because it felt that admitting his wife's
testimony was prejudicial to him. FED. R. CGum. P. 26, 52 (a). This
decision need not preclude modification of the common law rule as
the cout clearly stated that "reason and experience' could lead to
modification thereof.
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Attempts to modify the rule seem to be leading to gradual diminution and restriction of the common law rule by two methods.
One method is by gradually widening the scope of the "crimes
against the other spouse" provision of the rule to include offenses not
now contemplated within the statutory language. The Mann Act
dispensed with the violence provision for certain federal offenses
involving transporting one's wife in interstate commerce for immoral
purposes. Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1984). Some states
have expanded the "crimes against the other spouse" provision to
damage to property of the other spouse. Emerick v. People, 110
Colo. 572, 136 P.2d 668 (1948); In re Kellogg, 41 Cal. App. 2d 888,
107 P.2d 964 (1940). This at present seems to be the minority view
and is contrary to the holdings in most states, including West Virginia. State v. Clay, 135 W. Va. 618, 64 S.E.2d 117 (1951); Meade
v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 48 S.E.2d 858 (1943). By a second
method, other cases have modified the common law rule by allowing
a spouse to testify where the crime is against one other than the
spouse. O'Laughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d 543 (1932). In
this case the Colorado court, applying a state statute, admitted the
husband's testimony against the wife on a charge that she murdered
the husband's child. An extension of this minority view would enlarge the area of criminal cases in which one spouse may testify
against the other.
The policy and effectiveness of the common law rule in promoting domestic harmony has been questioned. Some writers
seem inclined to have the rule modified to assure admission of any
relevant testimony in a criminal case. McCovcK, EVmIDCE § 90
(1954). How much it is modified, of course, will depend upon statutes, rules and decisions and the supreme court's interpretation of
"reason and experience". One suggested modification would reduce
the privilege where it might tend to suppress relevent evidence.
Umom RuLE OF EvmiEcE § 28 (2).
It is evident from the Hawkins case that the common rule is still
in effect. However, modification of the rule has occurred in a minority of states and has been recommended by way of dictum and
in dissenting opinions in both federal and state courts. Therefore,
modification of the rule seems an inevitable trend.

J. J. P.
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